Message Text

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INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 ACDA-12 CIAE-00 INR-07 IO-13 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 EB-08 NRC-05 OES-07 SOE-02 DODE-00 DOE-11 SS-15 SP-02 PM-05 H-01 PA-01 PRS-01 USIA-06 EA-10 /137 W

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FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8656

INFO AMEMBASSY DACCA

AMEMBASSY COLOMBO

AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

AMEMBASSY KABUL

AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMCONSUL BOMBAY

AMCONSUL CALCUTTA

AMCONSUL MADRAS

CINCPAC

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CINCPAC FOR POLAD

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, MNUC, IN, UK, US

SUBJECT: INDO-SR-BRITISH NUCLEAR RELATIONS

REF: (AJT NE/SA WIRELESS FILE 6; (B) STATE 6596; (C) NEW DELHI 0437

1. JANUARY 11 STATESMAN HEADLINES WARREN UNNA'S STORY FROM WASHINGTON REPORTING THAT US OFFICIALS WERE SKEPTICAL OVER THE SIMON WINCHESTER DESPATCH FDREF -) IN THE WASHINGTON POST REPORTING BRITISH PM CALLAGHAN'S ACCOUNT OF DESAI'S CONDITIONS FOR SAFEGUARDS. (SIGNING OF THE CTB BY THE US, USSR AND UK) CONFIDENTIAL

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ACCORDING TO UNNA, US OFFICIALS SAID THAT EITHER CALLAGHAN OR WINCHESTER HAD MISSED THE POINT. UNNA REPORTED THAT THEY SAID BEGIN QUOTE DESAI'S -- AND INDIA'S -- POSITION HAD BEEN CONSISTENT ON LDREE POINTS; THERE MUST FIRST BE A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY, A COMMITMENT BY THE NUCLEAR POWERS TO NO ADDITIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS; AND A GRADUAL MOVE TOWARD OVERALL NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT. WITH THESE THREE

PRECONDITIONS, INDIA THEN WOULD NO LONGER FEEL DISCRIMINATED AGAINST IN AGREEING TO INTERNATIONAL INSPECTION AND SAFE-GUARDS OF ALL OF HER NUCLEAR FACILITIES.

THE US OFFICIALS SAID THAT THE FIRST CONDITION -- A COM-PREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY -- WOULD SOON BE MET, SO THERE WAS NO STICKLER THERE. AND IF SALT II WAS AGREED TO THIS YEAR BY THE SOVIET UNION, THE USA AND BRITAIN THE TREATY, BY DEFINI-TION, WOULD LIMIT NUCLEAR WEAPONS, BUT A SALT II AGREEMENT HAD PROVED PARTICULARLY ELUSIVE. AND INDIA'S THICY PRECON-DITION, AN ACTUAL NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT CUTBACK, IS DEFINTELY SOMETHING FOR THE INDEFINITE FUTURE. END QUOTE.

2. UNNA'S STORY WHICH APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN FILED BEFORE THE DEPARTMENT'S JANUARY 10 BRIEFING (REF B) WENT ON TO NOTE THAT REGINS

QUOTE AS FOR WHAT THE WINCHESTER DESPATCH SEEMED TO EMPHASIZE IN MR. CALLAGHAN'S REMARKS AFTER HIS TALKS WITH MR. DESAI -- NO LONGER INSISTING ON FRENCH AND CHINESE PARTICIPATION -- U.S. OFFICIALS SAID MR. DESAI, FROM THE BEGINNING, HAD NEVER BEEN PRECISE ABOUT INSISTING THAT FRANCE AND CHINA WOULD HAVE TO AGREE TO PARTICIPATE IN A TEST BAN TREATY. OVERALL, U.S. OFFICIALS HERE TRIED TO BE DIPLOMATIC TOWARD AMERICA'S BRITISH ALLY BY SAYING THAT WHAT MR. CALLAGHAN GOT OUT OF MR. DESAI WAS FURTHER CONFIRMATION THAT "HE HASN'T CLOSED THE DOOR" ON MOVING TOWARD SOME SORT OF NUCLEAR SAFEGUARD AGREEMENT.

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THE SITUATION SEEMED TO BE JUST ABOUT WHERE IT WAS WHEN PRESIDENT CARTER GOT MR. DESACGJS VIEWS FIRST-HAND DURING HIS NEW DELHI VISIT. END QUOTE

3. WE CAN UNDERSTAND WHY "US OFFICIALS" WOULD BE SCEPTICAL ABOUT WINCHESTER'S REPORT, WHICH RUNS CONTRARY TO OTHER ACCOUNTS OF WHAT CALLAGHAN PUBLICLY SAID DESAI HAD TOLD HIM AND WHAT THE TWO PM'S PRIVATELY AGREED CALLAGHAN SHOULD SAY IF QUERIED (REF:G

OUR DOUBTS ABOUT WINCHESTER'S RELIABILITY
ARE HEIGHTENED BY HIS ACCOUNT OF AN INTERVIEW GIVEN BY DESAI
TO HIM AND SEVERAL OTHER BRITISH REPORTERS WHO COVERED THE
CALLAGHAN VISIT. WINCHESTER TOLD US THAT DESAI HAD SAID THAT
WHAT DESAI REQUIRED FOR ACCEPTANCE OF FULL SCOPE SAFEGUARDS
WAS AGREEMENT BY THE US, UK, AND USSR ON A CTB, IN OTHER WORDS,
THE SAME CONDITION HE SAID IN HIS DESPATCH DESAI HAD GIVEN
CALLAGHAN. PUBLISHED ACCOUNTS OF THIS INTERVIEW DIFFER
WIDELY, AND HAVE ADDED TO THE CONFUSION HERE. A BRITISH HICOM OFFICER HAS EXPRESSED SERIOUS DOUBTS ABOUT WINCHESTER'S
REPORT TO US, AND WILL TRY TO GET AN ACCURATE VERSION FOR US
WHEN OTHERS WHO WERE AT THE DESAI INTERVIEW RETURN FROM BOMBAY.

4. AS FOR WHAT DESAI REALLY SAID TO CALLAGHAN, WE WILL BE MEETING TOMORROW WITH THE BRITISH DCM HERE TO GET THE PROMISED POST-VISIT BRIEFING. WE WOULD EXPECT AS COMPLETE AN ACCOUNT AS THEY THEMSELVES HAVE GOT. FURTHER INFO MAY, OF COURSE, SURFACE IN LONDON AFTER CALLAGHAN RETURNS THERE FROM HIS VISIT TO PAKISTAN. GOHEEN

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